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Judicial Discretion in light of the New European Rules on Jurisdiction in 
Civil and Commercial Matters: Reform or Continuity? 
Common Law Perspectives 
 
Aude Fiorini 
Senior Lecturer, University of Dundee Law School (UK) 
 
 
 
In what is now known as the European Union (EU), a process of integration started 
in the 1950s, leading to the gradual creation of an internal market1 where goods, 
people, services and capital move freely. The free movement of judgments can be 
presented as a necessary corollary of the four above-mentioned European 
freedoms. If widespread economic integration may be achieved notwithstanding 
significant differences between legal systems 2 , the reciprocal recognition and 
enforcement of judgments is, in Europe, considered to be a key factor in the 
promotion of cross-border legal transactions. Indeed “certain differences between 
national rules governing jurisdiction and the recognition of judgments hamper the 
sound operation of the internal market”. 3  This then justifies the adoption of 
“provisions to unify the rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial 
matters, and to ensure rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of 
judgments given in a Member State”.4     
 
                                                        
1 The creation of a common market was an objective of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established 
the EEC (European Economic Community). The European Court of Justice has defined what is 
meant by this expression.  In Case 15/81, Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v Inspecteur der 
Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Roosendaal, ECR 1982, 01409, it stated (at para 33): “The objectives of 
the Treaty (…) are laid down in Articles 2 and 3 among which appears, in the first place, the 
establishment of a common market. The concept of a common market as defined by the court in a 
consistent line of decisions involves the elimination of all obstacles to intra-community trade in 
order to merge the national markets into a single market by bringing about conditions as close as 
possible to those of a genuine internal market.  It is important that not only commerce as such but 
also private persons who happen to be conducting an economic transaction across national 
frontiers should be able to enjoy the benefits of that market.”  The Treaty of Lisbon replaced the 
references to “common” or “single” markets with that of “internal market”. According to Art 26 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ex Art 14 TEC, “1. The Union shall adopt 
measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the functioning of the internal market, in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties. 2. The internal market shall comprise an 
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital 
is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties”. 
2 See, eg, J Smits, The Making of European Private Law: Towards a Ius Commune Europaeum as a 
Mixed Legal System, Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2002, at 32. 
3 Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2012 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (Recast), OJ 2012 L 351/1, Recital 14. 
4 Ibid. 
 2 
The first step towards the adoption of such harmonized provisions was made in 
1968 with the conclusion of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(which was subsequently modified by accession conventions as the number of 
Member States of the European Communities progressively grew).5  In 1999, the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam transferred the competence to 
legislate in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters from the Member States 
to the European Union.6   This led to the transformation of the 1968 Brussels 
Convention, an instrument of inter-governmental cooperation, into a Regulation, 
a legal instrument of the Union that is binding and directly applicable, even to new 
Member States. 7   The Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
colloquially known as ‘Brussels I’ is, on the substance, a slightly modified version 
of the 1968 instrument: the Europeanisation process was not used as an 
opportunity to overhaul the instrument.  This opportunity however arose again 
through Art 73, which provided that “no later than five years after the entry into 
force of this Regulation, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Economic and Social Committee a report on the application of 
this Regulation. The report shall be accompanied, if need be, by proposals for 
adaptations to this Regulation”.  Following the publication of academic reports on 
the operation of Brussels I, the European Commission issued in 2009 its own 
Report8 and Green Paper9.  A year later, the Commission presented a legislative 
proposal for a Recast (reform) of the Brussels I Regulation.10  This signalled the 
start of a legislative procedure, which concluded two years later with the adoption 
of a new Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
                                                        
5 See the consolidated text of the Brussels Convention : OJ 1998 C 27/1. 
6 See Art 81 TFEU (ex Article 65 TEC):“1. The Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil 
matters having cross-border implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of 
judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such cooperation may include the adoption of 
measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. 2. For the 
purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures, particularly when necessary for the proper 
functioning of the internal market, aimed at ensuring: (a) the mutual recognition and enforcement 
between Member States of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases; (b) the cross-border 
service of judicial and extrajudicial documents; (c) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the 
Member States concerning conflict of laws and of jurisdiction; (d) cooperation in the taking of 
evidence; (e) effective access to justice; (f) the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning 
of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure 
applicable in the Member States; (g) the development of alternative methods of dispute settlement; 
(h) support for the training of the judiciary and judicial staff. (…)” 
7 See Art 288 TFEU. 
8 COM(2009) 174 final. 
9 COM (2009) 175 final. 
10 COM (2010) 748 final. 
 3 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast)11 which amended Brussels I 
and will replace it from 10 January 2015.12 
 
The Recast will be applicable in all 28 EU Member States. This is all the more 
notable that three EU Member States benefit from a special position since the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam: Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom are not in principle bound by measures taken by the EU in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice.13   Yet all three elected to participate in the Brussels 
I Recast.  Such decisions were made at different stages of the reform process and 
had different legal bases.   
Under Protocol No 22 Denmark does not participate in any measure taken on the 
basis of Title V of the TFEU but Brussels I has exceptionally been applicable in 
Denmark since 2007, following a special agreement negotiated in 2005 14  and 
linked to the fact that Denmark had been a contracting State of the 1968 Brussels 
Convention. In extending the application of the Brussels I Regulation to Denmark, 
the terms of the 2005 agreement also opened the possibility for this country to 
decide whether or not it wanted to be bound by any future measure modifying 
Brussels I.15 Denmark notified its decision to be bound by the Brussels I recast a 
few days after it was adopted.16   
The position of the UK and Ireland, the only common law countries of the 
European Union, is actually generally much more flexible than that of Denmark: 
Protocol 21 allows them to decide on a case by case basis whether they would like 
to be bound by the European measure adopted within the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice.  The default position is that they do not participate in any 
measures in this field, unless they so choose. Such a choice can be made either 
within 3 months of the publication by the European Commission of a proposal for 
a Regulation, or after the text is finally adopted – the latter option allows them to 
make a decision in view of the actual substance of the measure in question.17  Both 
                                                        
11 Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2012 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (Recast), OJ 2012 L 351/1. 
12 Art 81. 
13 This special position was reaffirmed following the Treaty of Lisbon.  See Protocol No 22 on the 
Position of Denmark, OJ 2012, C 326/299, and Protocol No 21 on the Position of the United 
Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, OJ 2012, C 326/295. 
14  OJ 2005 L 299/62.  This was linked to the fact that Denmark was bound by the Brussels 
Convention. 
15 Ibid. Art 3(2). 
16 OJ 2013 L 79/4. 
17 See Arts 3 & 4 of Protocol No 21. 
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the UK and Ireland however elected to take part from the outset in the elaboration 
of the Brussels I Recast under Art 3 of Protocol No 21.18  
 
At this juncture, it is important to recall that in the area of judicial cooperation in 
civil matters, individual States do not have individual control of the destiny of a 
proposed measure, except in the field of family law.19   The legal basis for the 
adoption of the Brussels I Recast was indeed Art 81(2) of the TFEU and implied 
the use of the so-called “ordinary legislative procedure” whereby only qualified 
majority voting is required at the Council (each State having one vote), for a 
measure to be adopted.  In this procedure, individual States are therefore bound 
by the will of the (qualified) majority.20 The notification of the wishes of the UK 
and Ireland to take part in the adoption of the Recast was thus all the more 
remarkable that, under Protocol 21, neither could subsequently retract its 
acceptance (and opt-out): the participation to the adoption process implies that 
the State will be bound by whatever measure comes out of the legislative process, 
even if its final content is markedly different from that of the initial proposal. 
Although the alternative path (declaration of opt-in only once the measure has 
been adopted, under Art 4) has been used since 2006, for example in the UK in the 
context of the adoption of the Rome I and Maintenance Regulations, it would have 
been very uncomfortable politically and the British Government was keen to avoid 
such a re-occurrence in the context of the Brussels I Recast. 21  Nonetheless 
participating in the adoption of the new Regulation was a real gamble.  Indeed the 
majority of stakeholders were against the extension, contained in the Commission 
Proposal, of the scope of the Brussels I Recast to defendants domiciled in third 
States. This modification of the criteria of applicability of the instrument and the 
proposed inclusion of harmonised subsidiary grounds of jurisdiction would have 
meant the suppression of domestic rules on jurisdiction and thus very 
substantially limited the possibility for courts in the UK and Ireland to continue to 
rely on their common law approaches to jurisdiction including the discretionary 
devices that have developed alongside these (e.g.: forum non conveniens doctrine 
and anti-suit injunctions). This paper evaluates the extent to which the new 
jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I Recast impact on the exercise of judicial 
discretion by courts in the EU. This question is closely linked with the nature of 
Brussels I as a civilian instrument.  Part I will consider how the activism of the 
European Court of Justice (now Court of Justice of the EU) had reinforced the 
                                                        
18  Recital 40, Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 
December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (Recast), OJ 2012 L 351/5. 
19 Art 81(3) TFEU 
20 Art 16(3) TEU. 
21 See A. Fiorini, ‘Le Règlement Bruxelles I bis à l’épreuve des institutions de common law -  le cas 
particulier des injonctions anti-suit’, in E Guinchard, Le Nouveau Règlement Bruxelles I bis, 
Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2014, p. 388. 
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civilian imprint of the Brussels I Regulation. Part II will assess whether the Recast 
is breaking away from what has been, for a period, considered the ‘systematic 
dismantling of the common law of conflict of laws’22 by the EC (now EU). 
 
 
 
I. Brussels I Regulation and the ‘systematic dismantling of the common 
law of conflict of laws’ 
 
One of the great divides between the common law and civil law approaches to 
jurisdiction concerns judicial discretion: “The idea that a national court has 
discretion in the exercise of its jurisdiction either territorially or as regards the 
subject matter of a dispute does not generally exist in Continental legal systems. 
Even where, in the rules relating to jurisdiction, tests of an exceptionally flexible 
nature are laid down, no room is left for the exercise of any discretionary latitude. 
It is true that Continental legal systems recognize the power of a court to transfer 
proceedings from one court to another. Even then the court has no discretion in 
determining whether or not this power should be exercised. In contrast, the law 
in the United Kingdom and in Ireland has evolved judicial discretionary powers in 
certain fields. In some cases, these correspond in practice to legal provisions 
regarding jurisdiction which are more detailed in the Continental States, while in 
others they have no counterpart on the Continent”.23 While it was understood 
from the outset that the Brussels regime was to operate along civilian lines (A), 
the full extent of the implications of such an approach was only understood after 
interpretative difficulties emerged out of the practical operation of this 
instrument (B). 
 
 
A. The Brussels Convention’s approach 
 
It is important to recall that when the Brussels I Convention was adopted in the 
1960’s, all the Member States of the then European Economic Community 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) belonged to 
the civil law tradition.  The Convention was thus naturally conceived as a civilian 
instrument.  The general jurisdiction rule followed the Roman principle actor 
sequitur forum rei: jurisdiction was to lie in the courts of the defendant’s domicile 
                                                        
22  T. Hartley, ‘The European Union and the Systematic Dismantling of the Common Law of 
Conflict of Laws’ I.C.L.Q. 2005, p. 813. 
23 P. Schlosser, Report on the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction 
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on its 
Interpretation by the Court of Justice, O.J. 1979 C 59/71 at para 76. 
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as understood in continental Europe24.  The Convention system of jurisdiction was 
organised around the principle of legal certainty, through a series of usually 
narrow and rigid jurisdiction rules 25 , with a chronological approach to the 
solution of lis pendens26 cases. The possible place within the instrument of forum 
non conveniens or indeed anti-suit injunctions, both of which were unknown in the 
legal systems of the drafters, was evidently not contemplated. 
 
The enlargement of the EEC to incorporate two European common law systems, 
UK and Ireland in the early 1970’s provided the first occasion to discuss the place 
of these discretionary tools within the Brussels I Convention. Indeed negotiations 
took place for 6 years to elaborate the necessary accession Convention.27 Although 
the very terms of the Act of Accession provided that the “new Member States 
undertook 'to accede to the Conventions provided for in Article 220 of the EEC 
Treaty, and to the Protocols on the interpretation of those Conventions by the 
Court of Justice, signed by the original Member States and to this end to enter into 
negotiations with the original Member States in order to make the necessary 
adjustments thereto28”, the notion of necessary adjustments was not defined and 
required some discussions within the Working Party. It was understood that 
                                                        
24  On the minor differences existing within the civilian definitions of domicile and the major 
differences between these and the common law concept, see Schlosser Report, op. cit., at para 71-
72. 
25 This contrasts with the traditional common law approach, cf Schlosser Report, op. cit., at para 
85: “According to the principles of common law which are unwritten and apply equally in the  
United Kingdom and Ireland, a court has jurisdiction in principle if the plaintiff has been properly 
served with the court process. The jurisdiction of Irish (and United Kingdom) courts is indirectly 
restricted to the extent of the limits imposed on the service of a writ of summons. Service is 
available without special leave only within the territory of Ireland (or the United Kingdom). 
However, every service validly effected there is sufficient to establish jurisdiction; even a short 
stay by the defendant in the territory concerned will suffice. Service abroad will be authorized only 
where certain specified conditions are satisfied. As regards legal relations within the EEC — 
especially because of the possibility of free movement of judgments resulting from the 1968 
Convention — there is no longer any justification for founding the jurisdiction of a court on the 
mere temporary presence of a person in the State of the court concerned. This common law 
jurisdiction, for which of course no statutory enactment can be cited, had therefore to be classed 
as exorbitant.” 
26 The convention’s approach contrasts with the traditional common law approach in this area, cf 
Schlosser Report, op. cit., at para 181: “The rules governing lis pendens in England and Wales, and 
to some extent in Scotland, are more flexible than those on the Continent. Basically, it is a question 
for the court's discretion whether a stay should be granted. The doctrine of lis pendens is therefore 
less fully developed there than in the Continental States. The practice is in a sense an application 
of the doctrine of forum conveniens”. 
27  Council Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation 
by the Court of Justice (Signed on 9 October 1978) (78/884/EEC) 
28 Schlosser Report, op. cit., para 1. 
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whilst a very narrow interpretation in the sense of indispensability was possible29, 
it would make it more difficult for the Brussels Convention to take root in the new 
Member States. Four considerations rendered a wider interpretation necessary, 
one of which being linked to “the special structural features of the legal systems 
of the new Member States”.30 
 
Discussions took place regarding the use of forum non conveniens but negotiators 
concluded that the practical reasons in its favour would “lose considerably in 
significance as soon as the Convention entered into force in the UK and Ireland” 
and thus forum non conveniens would become “largely unnecessary”.31 Therefore 
the “United Kingdom and Irish delegations did not press for a formal adjustment 
of the 1968 Convention on this point”.32  This does not mean that courts in England 
subsequently refrained from using the forum non conveniens doctrine entirely 
when seised on the basis of the Brussels I Convention.  Indeed, while its availability 
where the matter fell within the scope of the Convention was controversial, and 
while this technique was not used in the context of intra-EU disputes, the English 
court of Appeal, held that an English court seised under the Convention’s general 
jurisdiction rule could stay or dismiss proceedings on the ground of forum non 
conveniens in favour of a third State court. 33 
 
The availability of anti-suit injunctions was not discussed during the negotiation 
of the accession convention but it is difficult to believe that the entry into force of 
the Brussels Convention could not have affected the availability of these 
injunctions in the UK or Ireland. Several factors indeed rendered their 
compatibility with the Brussels regime rather questionable. Not only did they 
entail a form of judicial discretion that was foreign to the civilian character of the 
Convention, but they were tools that had been developed to deal with the “jungle 
of separate, broadly based, jurisdictions all over the world” and could thus be 
considered out of place in the context of an organised regional jurisdictional 
system such as that established by the Convention. 34   In addition, the ECJ 
determined quite clearly in the context of the continuing application by courts of 
their domestic procedural rules that “the application of national (…) rules may not 
impair the effectiveness of the Convention”.35 Given that an anti-suit injunction 
indirectly impacts on the exercise of its jurisdiction by the court seised by the 
addressee of the injunction, it could be expected that this tool should not be used 
where it interferes with the exercise of jurisdiction allocated to a European under 
                                                        
29 Ibid., para 15. 
30 Ibid., para 16. 
31 Ibid., para 78. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1992] Ch 72. 
34 Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel and Others [1999] 1 AC 119, per Lord Goff, pp. 132-134. 
35 Kongress Agentur Hagen GmbH v Zeehaghe bV (Case C-365/88) [1990] ECR I-1845, paras 17–20. 
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the Regulation. This being said anti-suit injunctions could appear as an effective 
and legitimate tool at least to respond to the breach of a dispute resolution clause 
and were granted in such cases for some years even where the Brussels regime 
applied.36  
 
The restrictions to the use of judicial discretion brought about by the Brussels 
regime were seen, in many ways, as a necessary compromise.  As stated by Lord 
Goff in the Airbus case37: “a system, developed by distinguished scholars, was 
embodied in the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1968) (…) under which jurisdiction 
is allocated on the basis of well-defined rules.  This system achieves its purpose, 
but at a price.  The price is rigidity, and rigidity can be productive of injustice.  The 
judges of this country, who loyally enforce this system (…) have to accept the fact 
that the practical results are from time to time unwelcome”.  This (resigned) good-
will was however put to the test by a series of interpretative rulings of the 
European Court of Justice which revealed the extent to which the traditional 
British approach had been truncated by the harmonised rules. 
 
 
B. The ECJ’s interpretation 
 
The civilian imprint of the Brussels Convention was either fully clarified or further 
exacerbated by the ECJ in a string of preliminary opinions chiefly delivered 
between 2003 and 2005.  These curtailed the traditional English approaches in 
areas in which the text of the Convention did not provide clear responses as to 
whether judicial discretion was open and which revealed the true extent of the 
gaps between common law and civil law principles underlying jurisdiction in 
cross-border cases. 
 
1. Gasser v Misat38 
 
In this case, the ECJ established that the lis pendens rule of the Convention had to 
be “interpreted as meaning that a court second seised whose jurisdiction has been 
claimed under an agreement conferring jurisdiction must nevertheless stay 
proceedings until the court first seised has declared that it has no jurisdiction” and 
that it could not “be derogated from where, in general, the duration of proceedings 
before the courts of the Contracting State in which the court first seised is 
                                                        
36 OT Africa Line Ltd v Hijazy (The Kribi) (No.1) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s rep. 76; [2001] C.L.C. 148; [2002] 
I.L.Pr. 18; Continental bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera sA [1994] 1 WLR 588 ; The Angelic Grace 
[1995] 1 Lloyd’s rep 87. 
37 Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel and Others, op. cit., pp.  131-132. 
38 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl (Case C-116/02) [2013] ECR I-14693. 
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established is excessively long”. 39    In support of an opposite view, the 
representative of the UK Government had, among other aspects, stressed the 
importance of examining the relationship of the prorogation and lis pendens 
provisions of the Convention bearing in mind the “the needs of international 
trade” and showed how supporting party autonomy would contribute to legal 
certainty since prorogation clauses “enable the parties, in the event of a dispute, 
easily to determine which courts will have jurisdiction to deal with it”.40 
The court however chose to adhere rigidly to two principles hitherto unwritten in 
the Convention: the principle of legal certainty and the principle of mutual trust: 
“the Brussels Convention is necessarily based on the trust which the Contracting 
States accord to each other's legal systems and judicial institutions. It is that 
mutual trust which has enabled a compulsory system of jurisdiction to be 
established (…). It is also common ground that the Convention thereby seeks to 
ensure legal certainty by allowing individuals to foresee with sufficient certainty 
which court will have jurisdiction”.41  
Given the terms of the decision and the interpretation of the principles of legal 
certainty and mutual trust that they reveal it could probably be inferred from this 
interpretative ruling that chosen courts that were second seised could not protect 
their jurisdiction by granting anti-suit injunctions affecting other courts in the EU.  
 
 
2. Turner v Grovit42 
 
The express outlawing of intra-European anti-suit injunctions within the Brussels 
regime, much anticipated in the aftermath the Gasser case, was confirmed just half 
a year later.  In this case, the Court of justice again used the principle of mutual 
trust to justify its ruling, according to which anti-suit injunctions, seen as 
“constituting an interference with the jurisdiction of a foreign court” were 
“incompatible with the system of the Convention”.43  The fact that the Court could 
infer such incompatibility from the principle of mutual trust was not in itself a 
surprise, given the position of the Brussels regime on the power of courts to 
review the jurisdiction of foreign courts.  However this principle, which is a 
necessary core of the Brussels system, is based on the still unrealistic if not 
entirely fictional idea of the equivalence between the European judicial systems, 
which weakens it somewhat. Further, its application in the Turner case was all the 
more unpalatable from a pragmatic point of view to some of the commentators 
                                                        
39 Ibid, para 73 & operative part. 
40 Ibid, at para 31. 
41 Ibid, para 72. 
42 Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit, Harada Ltd & Changepoint SA (Case C-
159/02), [2004] ECR I-3565. 
43 Ibid, para 27. 
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that the anti-suit injunction could have been used, in this particular instance, to 
support and protect deficient conventional mechanisms. 
 
 
3. Owusu v Jackson44 
 
The final instalment of what came to be referred to as the ‘systematic dismantling 
of the common law of conflict of laws’ happened when the ECJ took position for 
the first time on the extent to which Member States courts may rely on forum non 
conveniens when competently seised under the Convention.  In the Owusu case, 
proceedings had been started in England against several defendants, only one of 
whom was domiciled in the UK, in relation to severe injuries the claimant had 
suffered while holidaying in Jamaica.   
Drawing again from the principle of legal certainty45, the Court of Justice decided 
that the Brussels Convention precluded “a court of a Contracting State from 
declining the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 2 of that convention on the 
ground that a court of a non-Contracting State would be a more appropriate forum 
for the trial of the action even if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State is in 
issue or the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting 
State”46.  
 
The net result of these interpretative rulings, as seen from London, was that anti-
suit injunctions could only be used to restrain non-European proceedings, party 
autonomy was not efficiently protected and forum non conveniens could at best be 
used where the Regulation jurisdiction rules did not apply. As the Court of Justice 
had also relied on the principle of legal protection of persons established in the 
EC47  to justify its ruling in the Owusu case, it could be argued that forum non 
conveniens could not be used even where jurisdiction was established under the 
residual rules on jurisdiction as declining proceedings in such cases could deprive 
the claimant of the benefit of a European judgment, and thus of the system of free 
movement of judgments within the EC/EU.  
 
It may be important to stress that it is not the reduction of the domain of the 
traditional British approach to jurisdiction and the deprivation of judicial 
discretion itself that was difficult to accept for the United Kingdom but rather the 
unwelcome consequences that the too rigid European approach was considered 
to lead to: promotion of solutions that are contrary to the individual justice or the 
                                                        
44 Andrew Owusu v Nugent B Jackson, trading as “Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas” & others (Case C-
281/02), [2005] ECR I-1383. 
45 Ibid, para 38-41. 
46 Ibid, para 46. 
47 Ibid, para 39. 
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needs of commerce, weakening of the principle of party autonomy and absence of 
remedies preventing, or responding to, purely tactical behaviour. 
Nonetheless, as was pointed out above, the UK decided to participate in the 
adoption of the Recast, with no guarantee that the final text would be satisfactory.  
This of course revealed that there was general satisfaction with the European 
Commission’s proposal (notably in that it sought to correct the difficulties that had 
emerged in the practical operation of Brussels I –as exemplified by the Gasser and 
West Tankers case law).48  It was also the sign that the Government believed that 
a compromise could be found to safeguard residual rules of jurisdiction, and, with 
these, the availability of the forum non conveniens doctrine.49   Was such faith 
misplaced?   
 
 
 
II. Brussels I Regulation Recast – reform or continuation? 
 
 
The adopted text of the Recast does not contain any mention of the notions of anti-
suit injunctions or indeed forum non conveniens. Instead its Recital refers to the 
very principles of mutual trust50 and legal certainty51, on which the (in)famous 
decisions in Gasser, Turner, Owusu and West Tankers52 were based, as well as the 
principle of continuity.53  Does this imply that the Recast has maintained the status 
quo and the largely civilian imprint of the Brussels regime? To answer this 
question, the analysis of the impact of the Brussels I Recast on the use of 
discretionary devices such as forum non conveniens and anti-suit injunctions will 
be considered. 
 
A. To what extent might courts moderate the exercise of their own 
competence? 
 
                                                        
48  The decision by the UK Government to opt-in to the adoption of the Brussels I Recast was 
supported by the majority of stakeholders who responded to the Government consultation, as well 
as the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory committee on private international law, presided by Lord Mance, 
and the EU Select Committee of the House of Lords. 
49 A Fiorini, ‘Le Règlement Bruxelles I bis à l’épreuve des institutions de common law’, op.cit, p. 
389. 
50 Recital 26. 
51 Recital 16. 
52 Allianz SpA (formerly Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA) v West Tankers Inc (C-185/07) [2009] 1 
AC 1138; [2009] E.C.R. I-663. This decision confirmed thatn despite the exclusion of arbitration 
in Art 1(2) of Brussels I, anti-suit injunctions may not be used to sanction the breach of an 
arbitration clause if they lead to restraining European proceedings.  The immediate 
consequences of this ruling are similar to those flowing from the Gasser pronouncement. 
53 Recital 34. 
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Since the preliminary ruling in the Owusu case, it is clear that, where the Brussels 
I Regulation applies, a court seized on the basis of the general jurisdiction rule of 
Art 2 (defendant’s domicile) may not apply forum non conveniens where a court 
outside of the EU is found to be substantially more appropriate even if there exists 
no other link to the EU.  This decision of the Luxembourg Court was linked to the 
finding that Art 2 was mandatory.  As the Recast has however introduced a certain 
level of flexibility in the exercise of jurisdiction, the question arises whether these 
changes may lead to a widening of the situations in which forum non conveniens 
would be possible.  
 
 
1. In case of parallel proceedings 
 
a. Parallel proceedings involving two EU Member States courts 
 
As was the case under the Brussels I Regulation, the Recast contains a series of 
provisions on lis pendens and related actions involving two courts situated within 
the EU: Arts 29-32.  According to Art 29, “(…) where proceedings involving the 
same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the courts of 
different Member States, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own 
motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first 
seised is established 54  (…)  Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is 
established, any court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in 
favour of that court”.  The provision further organises the cooperation between 
courts in such situations: “upon request of the court seised of the dispute, any 
other court seised shall without delay inform the former court of the date when it 
was seised”.  Importantly it now also incorporates an “anti-Gasser” exception.  
Indeed Art 29 is reversed where the court second seised is the court the parties 
had chosen in an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, under Art 31(2).   Where Art 
29 does not apply, Art 30 provides for a similar chronological solution to the 
problem of parallel proceedings in the case of simply related actions. 
With these provisions, even as amended, the Recast contains express rules which 
specify the situations in which a court shall or might stay or decline proceedings, 
thus leaving no room for a discretionary device such as forum non conveniens.  
There is no change in this respect on the Recast.55 
 
 
b. Parallel proceedings involving an EU Member State court and a 
Third State court 
                                                        
54 Art 32 defines what is required for a court to be considered seised, for the purposes of Section 9 
of the Regulation. 
55 See, concurring, L. Usunier  ‘Le Règlement Bruxelles Ibis et la théorie de l’abus de droit’, in in E 
Guinchard, Le Nouveau Règlement Bruxelles I bis, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2014, p. 462. 
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The Brussels I Regulation, in its 2001 version, contained no provision dealing with 
proceedings running in parallel in a court situated in a Member State of the EU and 
a court situated outside of the EU. Although the case of Owusu did not involve a 
situation of lis pendens, and concerned a court seised on the basis of the general 
jurisdiction rule, the reasoning (in terms of legal certainty) and findings of the 
ECJ/CJEU in this case could probably be generalised to imply that the jurisdiction 
rules of the Regulation are all to be considered rigid and that courts of the EU 
competently seised under that Regulation could therefore not stay their 
proceedings or decline jurisdiction in favour of a court situated in a third State. 56 
One of the innovations of the Recast is the introduction of two provisions, Arts 33 
& 34, which cover the situations of lis pendens and related actions in courts within 
and outwith the EU.  According to these new rules, if a court situated in the EU is 
seised under the general or special jurisdiction rules of the Recast (Arts 4 or 7-9) 
and parallel proceedings are already pending outside of the EU, the European 
court may stay its proceedings if the foreign decision is expected to be entitled to 
recognition in that State (bearing in mind that this issue is not governed by the 
Brussels regime) and if a stay is considered to be necessary for the proper 
administration of justice.57 In case the proceedings concern actions that are not 
identical but merely related, an additional condition is imposed in that it has to be 
expedient to hear and determine the related actions together. 58   The new 
provisions also specify the conditions that apply to the continuation of the 
proceedings in such a situation as well as the declining of jurisdiction. 
Articles 33 and 34, in introducing a flexible mechanism to deal with parallel 
proceedings in the EU and in third States, represent a partial reversal of the Owusu 
case law: indeed the general and special jurisdiction rules of the Recast are no 
longer rigidly mandatory for European courts.  However of course, this reversal 
does not allow EU Member States to deal with the situation these provisions cover 
on the basis of their domestic approaches (forum non conveniens in the common 
law systems and international lis pendens in the civil law systems that allow it).  
Instead, Arts 33 & 34 introduce a harmonised tool so that all EU Member States 
can use the same level of judicial discretion to deal with such situations.59  
                                                        
56 It should be noted that notwithstanding the fact that the reasoning of the ECJ in Owusu could 
have been in equally applied in the context of other measures of judicial cooperation in civil 
matters, English courts have held that forum non conveniens applies to jurisdiction in divorce cases 
falling within the Brussels II a Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 
2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial 
matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000), see 
Mittal v Mittal [2013] EWCA Civ 1255; [2014] 2 W.L.R 1033; as well as jurisdiction in maintenance 
cases, see O v P [2014] EWHC 2225 (Fam). 
57 Art 33(1). 
58 Art 34(1). 
59 For a critical evaluation of the provisions, see C. Chalas, ‘L’affaire Ferrexpo: baptême anglais 
pour l’effet réflexe des articles 22, 27 et 28 du Règlement Bruxelles I’, Revue Critique de Droit 
International Privé 2013, pp. 359 et seq.  
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Yet this harmonised mechanism has very different features compared to those of 
the forum non conveniens doctrine60 and the judicial discretion it entails is encased 
by conditions which are differ from those governing the use of forum non 
conveniens. In particular, where forum non conveniens may be available even if no 
other court is seised – it is sufficient that the court is satisfied that a foreign court 
is available that could be competently seised – Arts 33 and 34 only apply where 
such foreign court has been seised already and indeed was seised before the court 
situated in a Member State. 61  While under English law, a court would only 
consider the forum non conveniens doctrine if the defendant has raised the matter, 
the Brussels I Recast does not impose this restriction and indeed allows courts in 
Member States to apply Arts 33 and 34 either on application by one of the parties 
or “where possible under national law, of its own motion”.  In addition, to bring a 
successful forum non conveniens application, the parties in the English 
proceedings would have to show not only that an available and competent foreign 
court is substantially more appropriate for the interests of all the parties and for 
the ends of justice but also that justice does not demand that the case be continued 
in England. While the burden of proof of the first leg of the reasoning is on the 
defendant, it shifts to the claimant as regards the second leg.  Given the terms of 
the Recast, it would appear that, at least in States which do not allow courts to use 
the first paragraph of Arts 33 & 34 on their own motion, the onus of proof would 
remain on the defendant. However the claimant could always, at a second stage, 
claim that the continuation of the proceedings is required under the second 
paragraph of Arts 33 & 34 by establishing that the proceedings in the court of the 
Third State are themselves stayed or discontinued or unlikely to be concluded 
within a reasonable time or that the continuation of the proceedings is required 
for the proper administration of justice.   
Under Arts 33 & 34, the aim of the court will not be to identify the natural forum62 
and assess whether it is not unjust that the claimant be deprived of English 
proceedings. Rather it is to assess that the court first seised’s judgment is capable 
of recognition and if so whether “the proper administration of justice” militates in 
favour of a stay. 63 While Arts 33 & 34 do not further define what is meant by the 
proper administration of justice64 and in particular whether this is to be evaluated 
                                                        
60 For the English approach, see Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460  
61 Arts 33(1) & 34(1). 
62 Factors pointing to the natural forum include e.g.: convenience, expense, the applicable law, 
residence or place of business of the parties, extent to which the proceedings are part of a larger 
dispute which should not be fragmented. 
63 Considering that the criterion of good administration of justice is a blanket provision allowing 
the court to decide generally on the opportunity of the stay, see L. Usunier, ‘Le Règlement 
Bruxelles Ibis et la théorie de l’abus de droit’, op. cit. & loc. cit. 
64 The reference to the good administration of justice was already found in the proposal and had 
been interpreted by some as a sign of the influence of forum non conveniens, see, e.g. C. 
Kessedjian, ‘Commentaire de la refonte du Règlement n°44/2001’, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit 
Européen 2011, pp. 117et seq. & E. Guinchard, ‘Votre cadeau de Noël est arrivé! Vous serez invite 
à l’échanger dans 10 ans’, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 2013, pp. 329 et seq. 
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from a public law (the State’s) or private law (the partie’s) perspective or a 
combination of both, some guidance is provided in Recital 24. Paragraph one 
clarifies that the Member State court is expected to follow a holistic approach: 
“when taking into account the proper administration of justice, the court of the 
Member State concerned should assess all the circumstances of the case before it.” 
Paragraph one then itemises some of the circumstances that may be taken into 
account (“connections between the facts of the case and the parties and the third 
State concerned, the stage to which the proceedings in the third State have 
progressed by the time proceedings are initiated in the court of the Member State 
and whether or not the court of the third State can be expected to give a judgment 
within a reasonable time”) but the  use of the expression “may include” shows that 
courts could choose to take account of other factors in addition or indeed instead 
of those listed.  Interestingly, in stating that “that assessment may also include 
consideration of the question whether the court of the third State has exclusive 
jurisdiction in the particular case in circumstances where a court of a Member 
State would have exclusive jurisdiction”, the second paragraph of Recital 24 
further allows courts to give a reflexive effect to Art 24 (exclusive jurisdiction) and 
25 (jurisdiction agreements). Such reflexive effect had been advocated by 
academics for 40 years65 and had received some judicial support.66 
 
 
2. In the absence of parallel proceedings 
 
In England the forum non conveniens doctrine could be applied even in situations 
in which only one court is seised: one of the factors to be considered by the court 
is whether a competent foreign court is available but it is not required that 
proceedings are on-going before the foreign court.67 Is judicial discretion similarly 
available in the absence of parallel proceedings under the Recast?  
 
                                                        
65 GAL Droz, Compétence judiciaire et effets des jugements dans le marché commun, Dalloz, Paris, 
1972, pp. 165 et seq & 216 et seq.   
66 Ferrexpo AG v Gilson Investment Ltd and others [2012] EWHC 721 (Comm).   
67 Contrary to popular belief on the continent, the fact that proceedings are indeed on-going abroad 
is not however without relevance within the forum non conveniens approach, cf. The Abidin Daver 
[1984] AC 398: “Where a suit about a particular subject matter between a plaintiff and a defendant 
is already pending in a foreign court which is a natural and appropriate forum for the resolution 
of the dispute between them, and the defendant in the foreign suit seeks to institute as plaintiff an 
action in England about the same matter to which the person who is plaintiff in the foreign suit is 
made defendant, then the additional inconvenience and expense which must result from allowing 
two sets of legal proceedings to be pursued concurrently in two different countries where the same 
facts will be in issue and the testimony of the same witnesses required, can only be justified if the 
would-be plaintiff can establish objectively by cogent evidence that there is some personal or 
juridical advantage that would be available to him only in the English action that is of such 
importance that it would cause injustice to him to deprive him of it”, at pp. 411-412. 
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Under the Brussels I Regulation the answer was in the negative as was confirmed 
by the European Court of Justice in the Owusu case.  According to the ECJ, “no 
exception on the basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine was provided for by 
the authors of the Convention”68 and the application of the doctrine is “liable to 
undermine the predictability of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the 
Convention, and consequently to undermine the principle of legal certainty, which 
is the basis of the Convention”.69  
As was the case of the 1968 Convention and of Regulation 44/2001, Regulation 
1215/2012 does not contain any provision on the power of courts competently 
seised under the jurisdiction provisions of this instrument to stay proceedings or 
even decline jurisdiction in the absence of parallel proceedings.  The partial 
reversal of the Owusu case introduced by Arts 33 & 34 and described above is 
limited to situations in which not only there are parallel proceedings abroad – in 
a third State – but these were started prior to the proceedings pending in the EU. 
There is thus no doubt that, a contrario, where a court is seised on the basis of a 
jurisdiction rule of the Recast, it cannot discretionarily stay its proceedings or 
decline jurisdiction in favour of a court situated in a third State.  In situations not 
covered by Arts 33 & 34, the principles laid down by the ECJ in Owusu should 
continue to apply.70  Given that jurisdiction grounds are organised in a hierarchy, 
in the majority of cases only one court will have jurisdiction under the Regulation.  
The only situations where courts in more than one Member State could potentially 
be competently seised of the same dispute would be in the context of the general 
jurisdiction or the special jurisdiction rules (for example in case the defendant can 
be considered domiciled in more than one Member State or in case the court with 
jurisdiction under Art 4 does not coincide with the court with jurisdiction under 
Art 7).  The fact that all rules of jurisdiction in the Regulation are considered 
appropriate (those which are not are prohibited and where a real conflict arises – 
situation of lis pendens – it is resolved entirely neutrally on the basis of a 
chronological criterion) means that there is absolutely no space in the Regulation 
for judicial discretion in the exercise of jurisdiction unless otherwise provided by 
the terms of the instrument. 
 
Of course, where the Recast does not apply and courts exercise jurisdiction on the 
basis of their residual grounds of jurisdiction, they are at liberty to have resort to 
forum non conveniens where applicable under their own law. It is to be noted 
however in this context that the Recast has extended the scope of application of 
the Brussels I regime to situations hitherto no covered by the 2001 text.  Indeed, 
in addition to situations of exclusive jurisdiction in the EU or jurisdiction 
agreement in favour of an EU Member State court (to which the Brussels I regime 
                                                        
68 Owusu v Jackson, op. cit,  para 37. 
69 Ibid,  para 41. 
70 Cf the principle of continuity in Recital 34. 
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traditionally applied), Art 6(1) extends the scope of the Recast to defendants not 
domiciled in the EU where Art 18(1) and 21(2) apply, i.e. to disputes involving 
consumers domiciled in the EU or employees habitually carrying out their work 
in the EU or employed by businesses situated in the EU to carry out work in more 
than one country.  This extension of the applicability of the Brussels I regime to 
hitherto ‘unchartered territories’ will mechanically restrict the scope of use of 
forum non conveniens (or similar discretionary devices) by courts in the EU. 
 
 
 
B. To what extent might courts influence the exercise by other courts of their 
competence? 
 
1. Injunctions restraining European proceedings 
 
Anti-suit injunctions are traditionally used in England to regulate the exercise of 
jurisdiction in situations in which the English court is the natural forum and the 
foreign proceedings are oppressive, vexatious or otherwise unconscionable or, 
very importantly, to sanction the breach of dispute resolution agreement by one 
of the parties.71 
It is well established, at least since the Turner case, that anti-suit injunctions 
cannot be used where the Brussels I Regulation regime applies to restrain 
European proceedings.72  The Brussels I Recast continues, of course, to refer to the 
principle of mutual trust (without which the free movement of judgments could 
not be achieved).  However it also markedly reinforces party autonomy.  The 
question therefore arises whether this new orientation might impact on the 
availability of anti-suit injunctions in Europe. 
 
 
a. Could an anti-suit injunction restraining proceedings in one EU Member 
State be granted in the event of the breach of a jurisdiction agreement in 
favour of another Member State? 
 
In case of parallel proceedings in two Member States of the EU, the Recast provides 
in Art 31(2), that by way of exception to the prior tempore rule that Art 25 
maintains, where a court of a Member State designated in an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement is seised, “any court of another Member State shall stay the 
proceedings until such time as the court seised on the basis of the agreement 
declares that it has no jurisdiction under the agreement”. This provision obviously 
largely removes the need for anti-suit injunctions, unless, of course, the non-
                                                        
71 Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64; [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 425; [2002] C.L.C. 440. 
72 Turner v Grovit, op. cit. 
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chosen court were to fail to stay its proceedings as imposed by the Recast.  Could 
use be made of an injunction in such an exceptional situation? Arguably not. 
In giving priority to the chosen (but second seised) court to decide whether it has 
jurisdiction, the Recast does not give that court the right to assess the jurisdiction 
of the court first seised: it has simply organised a limited reversal of the priority 
rule.73 In other words the reform introduced by the Recast does not mean that the 
reinforcement of the principle of party autonomy is accompanied by a weakening 
of the principle of mutual trust to the extent that anti-suit injunctions could now 
be used even where they affect the jurisdiction of sister States.  The reasons 
underpinning the Turner case are as valid under the Recast as they were under the 
Convention.74 
 
 
b. Could an anti-suit injunction restraining proceedings in one EU Member 
State be granted in the event of the breach of a jurisdiction agreement in 
favour of a third State? 
 
Given what has just been said regarding the continued relevance of the principle 
of mutual trust, an answer would immediately appear to have to be in the negative.  
This conclusion is actually further reinforced by the analysis of the new Arts 33 & 
34.  Indeed these provisions allow courts in EU Member States to take account of 
judicial agreements in favour of third States in certain limited situations; they by 
no means oblige EU Member State courts to do so.  
Either an anti-suit injunction would be entirely pointless (in case the European 
court decided to stay its proceedings) or it would be contrary both to the principle 
of mutual trust generally underpinning the Brussels regime and to the specific 
right to decide whether or not to stay one’s proceedings that is now newly set out 
in Arts 33 & 34. 
 
 
 
2. Injunctions restraining third States proceedings 
 
Regulation 44/2001 contains no provision governing the situation of parallel 
proceedings in the EU and outside of the EU: the provisions of chapter 2 section 9 
(lis pendens and related actions) and chapter 3 (recognition and enforcement) 
apply only to intra-EU situations.  As a result, States can rely on their traditional 
rules to manage potential or actual conflict of procedures or of judgments. In the 
UK, anti-suit injunctions are efficient tools to deal with these situations and have 
                                                        
73 See A. Fiorini, “Le règlement Bruxelles I bis à l’épreuve des institutions de Common Law– Le cas 
particulier des injonctions anti-suit”, op. cit., pp. 393-394. 
74 Ibid.  
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continued to be used to restrain foreign proceedings whether or not the 
jurisdiction of the English court, considered to be the natural forum, was based on 
the Brussels I regime or on residual rules.  What is the impact of the new Arts 33 
& 34 on the use of anti-suit injunctions to restrain third States proceedings in such 
situations?   
 
The discretionary mechanism introduced by Arts 33 & 34 is now the only tool 
courts can use to moderate the exercise of their own jurisdiction where the 
Brussels I Recast applied.  The new text (articles and Recital) does not however 
state that this new, harmonised approach is to replace all the tools that, in the 
Member States’ legal arsenal have the same aim (the prevention of conflict of 
decisions) but use different techniques to achieve it (in particular do not work by 
moderating the court’s own competence).  Given that Arts 33 & 34 allow Member 
States courts to stay proceedings when they have jurisdiction pursuant to Arts 4, 
7, 8 or 9 (provided of course the other conditions imposed by the Regulation are 
also met), it follows that Member States courts competently seised on the basis of 
other provisions of the Recast (exclusive jurisdiction (Art 24), protective 
jurisdiction (Arts 10-23) or jurisdiction agreements (Art 25)) cannot and should 
not give way to proceedings in Third States. Using anti-suit injunctions in such 
situations to protect the exercise of jurisdiction in Europe should be maintained 
as it would not contradict the harmonised approach and would support the 
effectiveness of another aim of the Brussels regime: the minimisation of conflicts 
of decisions.  As Art 45(1)(d) maintains the priority (over the decision of another 
Member State) of the earlier decision of a third State involving the same cause of 
action and between the same parties provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the 
conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State addressed, the use of 
anti-suit injunctions would enable a more “harmonious administration of justice” 
on the territory of the EU as it would further limit the number of irreconcilable 
judgments having effect in different Member States.75 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Under the Brussels I Recast, the domain of both anti-suit injunctions and forum 
non conveniens has, if anything, been even further reduced.  However the Recast 
has not only corrected some of the unwelcome consequences of an overly civilian 
interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation but simultaneously introduced, on the 
whole territory of the EU, a harmonised mechanism of jurisdictional regulation 
                                                        
75 See Recital 21, sentence 1.   For a more detailed discussion, see A. Fiorini, “Le règlement Bruxelles 
I bis à l’épreuve des institutions de Common Law– Le cas particulier des injonctions anti-suit”, op. 
cit., pp. 397 et seq. 
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based on judicial discretion (which was hitherto available only in a few Member 
States). On this aspect, the Recast has the great merit of promoting (at least on 
paper) a better coordination between European and third States procedures, and 
one that may be easier to anticipate in third countries. Admittedly, Arts 33 & 34 
are not ideal76: why, for example, limit their application to the situations where 
courts in Third States are seised first?  Why not use a similar mechanism to resolve 
lis pendens and related actions in intra-EU situations? Will all courts apply these 
provisions consistently? Ultimately only practice will tell if the price to pay for this 
aspect of the reform in terms of legal certainty will always be compensated by a 
net gain in terms of justice. 
 
 
                                                        
76 Other ‘models’ could have been considered. Comp. for example Art 3-9 of the Japanese CCP, 
which introduces judicial discretion in an otherwise civilian approach to international jurisdiction 
and is used to compensate the absence of any lis pendens provision (on this, see Y. Hayakawa, ‘Lis 
pendens’, Japanese Yearbook of International Law 2011 (54) at p. 332). Art 3-9 provides: “Dismissal 
of Action on Account of Special Circumstances. Even where the courts of japan have jurisdiction 
over an action (excluding cases where the action is filed on the ground of choice of court agreement 
designating the courts of japan exclusively), the court may dismiss the whole or a part of such 
action when it finds special circumstances under which a trial and judicial decision by the courts 
of japan would undermine equity between the parties or disturb realization of a proper and 
prompt trial, taking into consideration the nature of the case, the degree of the defendant's burden 
of submitting defence, the location of the evidence and any other circumstances”. For a general 
introduction to the new Japanese civil procedure rules on international jurisdiction, see M. 
Dogauchi, ‘New Japanese Rules on International Jurisdiction – General Observation’, Japanese 
Yearbook of International Law 2011 (54), pp. 260-277. 
 
